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Abstract 
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) predicts elicitation of an initial estimate 
will prompt subsequent minimum and maximum estimates to 
lie close to the initial estimate, resulting in narrow ranges and 
overconfidence. Evidence for this, however, is mixed; while 
Heywood-Smith, Welsh & Begg (2008) observed narrower 
subsequent ranges, Block and Harper (1991) report ranges 
became wider. One suggestion has been that this reflects a 
difference between expert and novice reactions to elicitation 
tasks. The present study investigated whether the interplay 
between expertise and number preferences leads to the 
paradoxical effects of an initial estimate. Participants with 
high expertise make precise estimates whereas participants 
with less expertise prefer rounded numbers, which could, 
potentially, reduce the impact of anchors. We confirm that 
expertise affects the precision of estimates and observe results 
indicative of the theorized effect – an interaction between 
expertise and elicitation method on range widths. 
Keywords: anchoring; overconfidence; number preference; 
precision 
 
In fields where empirical data is limited or unavailable, 
decisions are often based on expert judgment. For example, 
current industry practice in petroleum exploration requires 
exploration geologists to provide 80% confidence ranges on 
relevant factors (e.g., rock porosity, reservoir thickness) 
prior to drilling (Hawkins, Coopersmith, & Cunningham, 
2002). A typical result, however, is overconfidence 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982), where the level 
of confidence reported is much higher than the proportion of 
ranges containing the true value. This bias has been 
observed not only in oil and gas industry personnel (Welsh, 
Bratvold, & Begg, 2005), but in a multiplicity of experts 
including clinicians (Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 
1981), business managers (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992) and 
social scientists (Tetlock, 1999). Theoretical interest in 
factors affecting overconfidence is therefore shared by 
technical and psychological disciplines alike. 
A popular explanation for overconfidence stems from the 
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, first suggested by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974): people start from an initial 
value, an anchor, which they insufficiently adjust from to 
provide a range. While this anchoring-and-adjustment 
explanation has received support (Russo & Schoemaker, 
1992; Heywood-Smith, Welsh & Begg 2008), several 
studies found that requesting a best initial estimate resulted 
in wider ranges, that is, reduced overconfidence (see, e.g., 
Block & Harper, 1991; Clemen 2001; Juslin, Wennerholm 
and Olsson, 1999; Soll & Klayman, 2004; Winman, 
Hansson, & Juslin, 2004).   
Yaniv and Foster (1995) theorized there is a trade-off 
between accuracy and informativeness in uncertain 
judgment tasks. The precision or “graininess” in estimates is 
used to convey confidence. On the aforementioned 
calibration task, for example, an individual uncertain of 
their knowledge should produce a wide, less precise range 
to represent uncertainty. However, although wider ranges 
are more likely to encompass the true value, as estimates 
become less precise (i.e., “grainier”), they also become less 
informative of the true value. 
There is a possibility that, in order to boost 
informativeness, experts in a topic are more inclined to 
generate precise estimates than laypeople. Should this 
indeed be the case, such a difference in number preference 
may help clarify the relationship between anchoring and 
overconfidence.  
Such number preferences could place limits on the 
minimum width of a range that vary by elicitation method. 
For example, an individual who prefers to give estimates in 
multiples of 100 (to characterize their uncertainty about the 
true values) may generate a range of 100-200. If requested 
to provide an initial best guess, using the same scale this 
person would estimate either 100 (prompting a wider range 
of 0-200) or 200 (range: 100-300). The wider range 
resulting from this preference for round numbers would 
therefore remove any anchoring effect the initial best guess 
had on the end-points (and, thereby, reduce 
overconfidence). Where uncertainty is high and precision 
low, this effect may be sufficient to overwhelm any 
anchoring effect resulting from the best guess. In contrast, 
an expert’s tendency to produce precise estimates (i.e., 
fewer trailing zeros) will reduce or avoid this effect and thus 
any effect of anchoring resulting from the best guess will be 
observable. 
Research Aims 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect an initial 
best guess of a true value has on the width of elicited ranges 
at different gradations of expertise. It was hypothesized that 
individuals with less expertise would prefer to report 
estimates in rounded numbers. A best guess would be made 
as, for example, a multiple of 10. Subsequent adjustment 
from this anchor would be made on the same scale to obtain 
minimum and maximum estimates, thereby reducing the 
impact of anchoring. Conversely, highly expert individuals 
would report precise estimates. Anchoring on the best guess 
would therefore be more apparent as adjustments for ranges 




Participants were 307 undergraduate psychology students 
studying at the University of Adelaide (83 males and 224 
females), aged 16 to 53 years (M = 20.07, SD = 4.68) who 
participated for course credit. 
Materials 
Two purpose-designed 20-item questionnaires were used to 
assess number preference and the effect of an initial best 
guess at different gradations of self-rated expertise. The 
questionnaires comprised Australian Football League (AFL) 
and general knowledge trivia. There were two experimental 
conditions – best guess first and range only. For example, 
on the AFL trivia item “In what year did the Adelaide 
Crows join the AFL?”; participants in the best guess first 
condition would provide their best estimate of the actual 
answer before a range (i.e., a low and a high guess) which 
they were 80% confident contained the actual answer. 
Participants in the range only condition did not provide an 
initial best guess. In addition to these confidence intervals, 
participants rated their confidence that their answer 
contained the true value, on a 3-point scale: 1 (Absolutely 
no idea), 2 (I had a vague idea) and 3 (I felt that I knew). 
Confidence was assessed as the average of all confidence 
ratings across questions. 
Procedure 
Data was collected online using SurveyMonkey. In addition 
to demographics (age and gender), participants were asked 
to self-rate their expertise: “What percentage of the 
Australian population do you have more knowledge of AFL 
than?”  
Participants were also asked about their engagement in 
football-related activities, i.e., “How many AFL games do 
you watch per week?”; and “How many years have you 
been following AFL?” Other questions were scored on 
rating scales: “Do you play football?” (0 = No; 1 = Yes); 
“How often do you attend AFL games?” (0 = Never to 5 = 
Weekly); “How often do you read or watch news reports 
about football?” (0 = Never to 4 = Daily). 
Allocation to one of the two conditions (best guess first or 
range only) was randomized, but all participants completed 






Range To enable comparisons across questions with 
answers of varying magnitudes, the distance between 
minimum and maximum estimates on each question was 
recorded as the relative range –the maximum minus the 
minimum estimate, divided by the true value. Higher scores 
indicated wider ranges. 
 
Precision Number preference was assessed in terms of 
precision – the number of final zeros in an estimate. For 
example, an estimate of 100 (2 final zeros), would be scored 
at precision 2. Lower scores therefore indicated greater 
precision.  
 
Error As our error measure we used proportional error. 
This was calculated as the average of all error scores 
proportional to the true value. For the range only condition, 
error was assessed as the absolute difference between the 
midpoint of the participant’s provided range and the true 
answer. For the best guess first condition, error was 
measured as the absolute difference between their best guess 
and the true answer for each question. Thus, higher scores 
denoted greater error. 
Preliminary Analyses                                                                                                                             
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure expertise on 
the AFL questionnaire was appropriately measured by self-
ratings. 
Spearman rank order correlations confirmed self-rated 
AFL expertise correlated positively with football-related 
activities. The number of games watched weekly (ρ = .54), 
years individuals followed AFL (ρ = .54), reading or 
watching AFL news (ρ = .46) and AFL game attendance (ρ 
= .42) all had moderate correlations with self-rated expertise 
(all p < .001). The correlation between actually playing 
football and self-rated expertise was weak (ρ = .19, p = 
.001).   
Looking at correlations between self-rated AFL expertise 
and error on each of the AFL trivia questions in the range 
only condition, 18 of 20 reached significance in the 
predicted negative direction, ranging from ρ = -.15, p = .03 
to ρ = -.46, p < .001. Only one correlation between self-
rated AFL expertise and error was positive, ρ = .23, p = 
<.01.  
Similarly, in the best guess first condition, 18 of the 20 
correlations between self-rated AFL expertise and error 
reached significance in the predicted negative direction, 
ranging from ρ = -.18, p = .03 to ρ = -.47, p < .001. The 
same item produced a positive correlation between self-
rated AFL expertise and error, ρ = .27, p = <.01.  
A non-parametric one-tailed sign test indicates the overall 
negative trend (i.e., 18 out of 20 correlations in the negative 
direction) is, itself, significant, p = 2.0x10-4. 
Mean correlations between AFL expertise and error in the 
range only and best guess conditions were ρ = -.15, p < .001 
and ρ = -.19, p < .001, respectively. 
Table 1 shows that participants’ confidence calculated 
from the AFL questionnaire (i.e., the average of all of a 
person’s confidence ratings reported in that questionnaire) 
had a moderate, positive correlation with self-rated expertise 
(ρ = .56, p <.001).  The correlation between confidence and 
error (ρ = -.72, p <.001), however, was higher than the 
1948
correlation between self-rated expertise and error (ρ = -.47, 
p <.001), indicating that confidence itself was a good 
measure of people’s degree of expertise. Given this, the 
confidence measure calculated from the general knowledge 
questionnaire was used to indicate expertise in general 
knowledge. The correlation between confidence and error 
on the general knowledge task was weaker but in the 
predicted direction (ρ = -.31, p <.001; see Table 2). 
 
Table 1: Spearman correlation matrix for AFL 
questionnaire variables 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Expertise - <.001 <.01 <.001 <.001 
2 Conf. .56 - <.01 <.001 <.001 
3 Precision -.16 -.16 - <.001 .14 
4 Range -.42 -.58 .46 - <.001 
5 Error -.47 -.72 .07 .56 - 
Note: Lower triangle cells show the correlation ρ. Upper 
triangle cells show the p-value. N = 263. Precision, range 
and error are averages across questions. 
 
Table 2: Spearman correlation matrix for general 
knowledge questionnaire variables 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
1 Conf. - <.001 <.001 <.001 
2 Precision  -.31 - <.001 <.001 
3  Range -.21 .58 - <.001 
4  Error -.31 .24 .47 - 
Note: Lower triangle cells show the correlation ρ. Upper 
triangle cells show the p-value. N = 280. Precision, range 




Expertise in AFL Self-ratings of AFL expertise were split 
such that participants rating their knowledge as less than 
that of 50% of the Australian population were grouped ‘low 
expertise’. Remaining participants who rated their 




Expertise in General Knowledge Participants who 
reported an average confidence rating of less than 2 were 
grouped ‘low expertise’. Remaining participants with an 
average confidence rating greater than or equal to 2 were 
‘high expertise’.  
Interactions between Expertise and Elicitation 
Method 
It was hypothesized that eliciting a best guess first would 
cause observable anchoring in high expertise participants; 
while a best guess in low expertise participants could 
prompt a greater widening of range end-points. 
Figure 1 shows that, on the AFL questionnaire, best 
guesses led to wider ranges in both expertise groups and 
high expertise participants gave narrower ranges1 (range 
only tM20 = .041, CI95 = .030, .053; best guess first tM20 = 
.074, CI95 = .056, .096) than low expertise participants 
(range only tM20 = .110, CI95 = .097, .124; best guess first 
tM20 = .176, CI95 = .155, .198).  
The same pattern was found for expertise and condition 
on the general knowledge questionnaire: the best guess first 
condition produced wider ranges and participants with high 
expertise had narrower mean ranges (range only tM20 = 
.109, CI95 = .092, .128; best guess first tM20 = .150, CI95 = 
.125, .178) than participants with low expertise (range only 
tM20 = .157, CI95 = .145, .170; best guess first tM20 = .265, 
CI95 = .241, .290). 
 
 
Figure 1: 20% trimmed mean range and 95% confidence 
intervals for low and high expertise participants in range 
only (RO) and Best guess first (BG) conditions of the AFL 
questionnaire (left) and general knowledge questionnaire 
(right). AFL low expertise RO N = 105; BG N = 82. High 
expertise RO N = 45; BG N = 31. General knowledge low 
expertise RO N = 116; BG N = 84. High expertise RO N = 
47; BG N = 33.  
 
Visual inspection of the pattern of results is suggestive of 
an interaction effect of expertise on condition on both AFL 
and general knowledge questionnaires: that is, the results 
suggest that the ranges given by low expertise people are 
being more strongly affected by the inclusion of a best guess 
than those of experts. Standard two-way analyses of 
                                                          
1Variables violated the assumptions of standard parametric 
procedures; therefore 20% trimmed means are reported to improve 
robustness against outliers and skewness (Keselman, Algina, Lix, 
Wilcox, & Deering, 2008). Confidence intervals around these 
means were calculated using a percentile bootstrap method with 
10,000 bootstrap samples (see Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008). 
1949
variance2, however, indicated these interactions were not 
significant on either the AFL (F(1, 259) = .29, p = .59, 
partial η2= .001), or the general knowledge questionnaire 
(F(1, 276) = .04, p = .84, partial η2 = .00). It is worth noting 
that Levene’s test on range in the general knowledge 
questionnaire indicated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was not met (F(3, 276) = 7.57, p < .001). 
Given that the ANOVAs checking for these interactions 
were conducted on the ranks for range, there are also 
concerns regarding the statistical power of the test, 
particularly as there is a further loss of power in the 
ANOVA result for the general knowledge task resulting 
from the combination of unequal variances with uneven 
sample sizes. In short, the reliability of the ANOVA results 
is questionable. 
As a result of this and the direct observations of Figure 1, 
which seem to imply an interaction effect of noticeable 
strength, we conducted an additional analysis.  
Testing for an interaction effect between expertise and 
elicitation method is non-trivial in this case. This is because 
we wish to test the interaction on the 20% trimmed means 
(not the mean or median), controlling for possible main 
effects, without assuming normality. To do so, we 
constructed a nonparametric permutation-based test. Our 
test statistic was the extent to which the cell-20% trimmed 
means deviated from the values predicted by a model 
consisting solely of main effects (the extent of this variation 
is formalized via the standard deviation). The distribution of 
this statistic under the null hypothesis is estimated by 
constructing 100,000 random permutations of the grouping  
variables (i.e., elicitation method and expertise status). The 
p-value is estimated as the probability of observing a 
deviation from the main effect model predictions as large as 
or larger than the observed value. For the AFL data, the 
observed value of .034 is highly significant relative to the 
null distribution that has mean .01 and std. dev .005 (p < 
.001). For the general knowledge data, we obtained a test 
statistic of .04, evaluated against a null distribution with 
mean .01 and std. dev .006 (p < .001). 
Main Effect of Precision 
Figure 2 confirms the prediction that high expertise 
participants would produce more precise estimates (range 
only tM20 = .168, CI95 = .133, .204; best guess first tM20 = 
.165, CI95 = .124, .208) than low expertise participants 
(range only tM20 = .282, CI95 = .258, .306; best guess first 
tM20 = .301, CI95 = .274, .329) on the AFL questionnaire. 
High expertise participants also provided more precise 
estimates (range only tM20 = .433, CI95 = .395, .471; best 
guess first tM20 = .492, CI95 = .448, .537) than less expert 
participants (range only tM20 = .560, CI95 = .536, .584; best 
guess first tM20 = .586, CI95 = .558, .613) on the general 
knowledge items. 
                                                          
2
 Because data was skewed, a rank transformation was performed 
on all observations for the range of estimates, with the lowest rank 
of “1” assigned to the smallest observation (see Conover & Iman, 
1981). 
Additional Findings 
A main effect of precision on condition was found for high 
expertise on the general knowledge questionnaire: estimates 
were more precise in the range only condition (tM20= 
.433,CI95 = .395, .471; best guess first tM20= .492, CI95 = 
.448, .537; see Figure 2). 
As depicted in Figure 3, on general knowledge items, 
high expertise participants produced less error (range only 
tM20 = 8.830, CI95 = 6.979, 11.036; best guess first tM20 = 
10.647, CI95 = 8.280, 13.379) than participants with low 
expertise (range only tM20 = 17.448, CI95 = 15.602, 19.521; 
best guess first tM20 = 15.578, CI95 = 13.879, 17.648).   
On the AFL questionnaire, participants with high 
expertise (range only tM20 = 5.935, CI95 = 4.041, 9.362; best 
guess first tM20 = 2.711, CI95 = 1.685, 4.712) showed less 
error than low expertise participants in the best guess first 
condition only (range only tM20 = 9.039, CI95 = 7.558, 
11.903; best guess first tM20 = 6.647, CI95 = 5.298, 8.558). 
 
 
Figure 2: 20% trimmed mean precision and 95% confidence 
intervals for low and high expertise participants in range 
only and best guess first conditions of the AFL 
questionnaire (left) and general knowledge questionnaire 
(right). Sample sizes as in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 3: 20% trimmed mean error and 95% confidence 
intervals for low and high expertise participants in range 
only and best guess first conditions of the AFL 
questionnaire (left) and general knowledge questionnaire 




 Note on Analyses 
It is important to note that although expertise was 
discretized in the above analyses, preliminary linear 
regression analyses3 with full continuous variables showed 
the same pattern of results.  
Discussion 
The results of this study showed main effects of both 
expertise and elicitation method (group). Participants with a 
high level of expertise reported estimates with greater 
precision than participants with less expertise and, in both 
cases, people who were asked for a best estimate first tended 
to give wider ranges. 
The most interesting result, however, is the interaction 
between these two. While difficult to analyze, due to 
violations of the assumptions of parametric tests and the 
accompanying loss of power in alternative tests, our 
interpretation of the data, both visually, from Figure 1 and 
statistically, using a specifically designed permutation test, 
lead us to conclude that people with low expertise were 
disproportionately affected by the inclusion of a best guess 
in both the AFL and general knowledge questions. 
That is, less expert people, when asked to estimate a range 
after having their best guess elicited, increase the width of 
those ranges more than do more expert people. 
This, we argue, may result from their greater preference 
for rounded numbers, which causes a sort of ‘buffering’ 
effect, whereby people’s estimates are forced wider because 
their best guess is already occupying one of the numbers 
that they would otherwise have used as the end-point of 
their range. 
Caveats 
However, a number of caveats should be taken into account 
when considering our results, including the difficulties we 
have encountered in analyzing the data. Traditional, 
parametric tests fail to yield reliable results when their 
assumptions are violated, yet their non-parametric 
equivalents often result in a loss of power – which makes 
the observation of interaction effects particularly difficult. 
This has necessitated our creation of a specific test for the 
interaction that we could see in Figure 1. 
Other concerns relate to the degree of expertise and 
number preference observed in our data. Less than a third of 
our sample rated themselves as better than 50% of the 
population in the AFL questions and confidence was lower 
on the general knowledge questions. With a mean self-rated 
expertise of less than 30% our sample may, as a result, 
suffer from restricted range, which would undermine the 
strength of any observed effects. The fact that expertise was 
self-rated and correlated with the other measures less well 
                                                          
3Distributions of variables were skewed. Thus, a rank 
transformation was performed on all observations, with the lowest 
rank of “1” assigned to the smallest observation. 
than a 3-point confidence rating also suggests that our 
division between high and low expertise may be more 
arbitrary than we would hope. 
Similarly, the degree of number preference shown on the 
AFL task, in particular, is extremely low, with the group 
averages ranging from .075 to .2 – indicating that, at most, 
people used an extra zero on every fifth estimate. This is 
much lower than rates observed in other experiments (see, 
e.g., Welsh, Navarro & Begg, in press, where an equivalent 
value above .9 was observed). 
Given this it could, reasonably, be argued that our 
experiment underestimates the magnitude of differences 
between experts and non-experts – particularly on tasks 
where uncertainty is higher. 
This may also explain the observation that both our 
‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ groups widened their ranges as a 
result of the inclusion of a best guess, rather than seeing 
narrower ranges in the expert group due to an anchoring 
effect. Otherwise, we would need to conclude that our 
experiment adds further evidence to the case against 
anchoring playing any significant role in causing 
overconfidence. Instead, as has been the case in the majority 
of instances, we observe that an initial best guess tends to 
widen rather than narrow subsequently elicited ranges, 
although by different amounts. 
Future Research 
As noted above, a key concern with the current analyses 
relates to the definition of expertise. While the self-ratings 
that we used did correlate in the expected manner with all of 
our variables, the fact that a simple 3-point confidence scale 
was a better predictor is concerning, as is the observation 
that so few of our sample regarded themselves as being of 
above average expertise on the task. 
To combat this, additional experiments, specifically 
targeting samples expected to have higher than average 
knowledge of the domain in question are required, along 
with pre-experimental testing to directly measure this 
knowledge. This will enable direct comparisons between 
people with genuinely high expertise and the general 
populace and thereby clarify the remaining question of 
whether true experts will actually be made more 
overconfident by the inclusion of a best guess in a range 
elicitation task. 
Conclusions 
Given the above, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
expertise does, differentially, affect people’s response to 
different elicitation methods. This is of great importance for 
the transfer of elicitation techniques between laboratory and 
applied settings as it suggests that effects observed in the 
laboratory may not be the same as those seen in practice. 
That is, an elicitation effect, shown to be of benefit in 
laboratory testing, still needs to be tested on experts before 
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